WHAT DO CHINESE CLIENTS WANT?
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Abstract
The world’s two largest economies are locked in an
escalating trade war, and caught in the crossfire are hundreds of
Chinese multinational companies (MNCs) that have made substantial
U.S. investments. Facing heightened legal risks in a less hospitable
environment, the Chinese MNCs increasingly depend on local
lawyers. Yet, their purchase of U.S. legal service, a topic of both
practical and theoretical importance, has received little attention. To
fill the gap, this article empirically investigates how Chinese
companies in the United States select their U.S. legal counsel. By
analyzing a unique dataset, the article finds that Chinese MNC
managers uniformly prioritize candidates’ practical experience and
ignore their educational credentials. Legal fees matter, but to a much
lesser degree than what one might infer from anecdotal evidence.
Some Chinese MNC managers also pay close attention to a U.S.
lawyer’s or law firm’s prestige, their Chinese or U.S. government
background, and to lawyer recommendations by acquaintances or by
the companies’ Chinese headquarters. Further empirical analysis of
lawyer selection preferences unveils variable connections with the
ownership types of Chinese investors. Sectoral regulation, in-house
legal capacity, and U.S. investment size also correlate with one or
several of the lawyer selection preferences. The findings offer
insights useful to U.S. lawyers and policymakers concerned with the
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opportunities and threats posed by the global expansion of Chinese
businesses and contribute to theoretical debates on multiple topics,
such as emerging market MNCs and their impacts on the legal
profession and the legal service market in the United States and other
developed countries.

I. INTRODUCTION
Economic globalization has profoundly reshaped the legal
profession and the legal service market, and the subject has captured
a great deal of scholarly attention.1 Yet, the vast existing literature
has largely neglected the recent ascendance of Chinese multinational
companies (MNCs). In contrast to MNCs in earlier waves of business
globalization, those from China have thrived in a home state
environment characterized by a weak judiciary. Moreover, Chinese
MNCs have generally endured and sometimes even benefited from
heavy-handed government intervention in corporate affairs and
business dealings.
Moving to developed host countries, Chinese MNCs
encounter enormous institutional divides. According to a Chinese
MNC manager, “We came to invest [in the United States] for the rule
of law, yet our biggest challenge here is also the rule of law.”2 To
traverse the institutional gaps, Chinese MNCs inevitably rely on local
legal professionals, especially now that the U.S. political and
regulatory environment has turned more hostile due to the escalating
trade war with China. However, this ever-increasing demand for
legal services, with its long-term impacts on the service market and
the legal profession, has received little scholarly attention. To begin
to fill in the lacuna, this article empirically examines Chinese MNCs’
purchases of U.S. legal services.
1

See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global-A
Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS.
L. REV. 251, 271-72 (2012); David B. Wilkins & Mihaela Papa, The Rise of the Corporate
Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Global Governance, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1149, 1151
(2013); Rachel Stern & Su Li, The Outpost Office: How International Law Firms Approach
the China Market, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 184, 205 (2015). Sida Liu, Globalization as
Boundary‐Blurring: International and Local Law Firms in China’s Corporate Law Market,
42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 231, 232 (2008); Carole Silver et al., Between Diffusion and
Distinctiveness in Globalization: U.S. Law Firms Go Glocal, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431,
1469-71 (2009).
2 JI LI, THE CLASH OF CAPITALISMS? CHINESE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2018).
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Our study comprises two sets of questions. First, how do
Chinese companies select their U.S. lawyers? There has been a lot of
research on related topics, such as the value of lawyers and the
globalization of law firms. Few scholars, however, have examined
Chinese MNCs and their purchase of legal services. Unlike foreign
investors from the UK or Canada, Chinese businesses have flourished
in a home state environment where law is often secondary to power
and connections,3 and companies generally undervalue high-quality
legal services.4 “In the Chinese legal system, where relationships are
often more important in problem-solving than understanding the
letter of the law, a Chinese lawyer who went to school with the
minister can be more helpful than a U.S.-trained lawyer who
understands the letter of the law.”5 Will Chinese MNCs in the United
States demonstrate similar preferences when selecting U.S. lawyers?
For instance, do they pay close attention to a U.S. lawyer’s
government background?
Second, as this article will show, intriguing inter-company
variations exist among Chinese MNCs in their lawyer selection
preferences. We will propose and then test a number of possible
explanations. Since a defining feature of Chinese outbound foreign
direct investment (FDI) is the prominent role of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), this article will explore whether Chinese
investors with state ownership pay special attention to certain
attributes of U.S. lawyer candidates.
To address these two sets of questions, we examine a unique
dataset derived from a comprehensive survey of Chinese MNCs in
the United States. The data provide an unprecedented window into
multiple factors that Chinese MNC managers consider when
selecting U.S. lawyers and enable statistical analyses of their
preference variations.
3 See, e.g., Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 106
(2017); Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and
the Use of Courts Among Private Firms in China, 76 J. POL. 318, 320 (2014); Wei Zhang &
Ji Li, Weak Law v. Strong Ties: An Empirical Study of Business Investment, Law and
Political Connections in China, 13 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 9 (2017); Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng,
“It Must Be Rock Strong!” Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making in China, 65 AM.
J. COMP. L. 841, 851 (2017).
4 Sida Liu, Client Influence and the Contingency of Professionalism: The Work of Elite
Corporate Lawyers in China, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 751, 768 (2006).
5 Dennis M. Horn, Navigating China and U.S. Law—A Growing Practice Area, 18
BUS. L. TODAY 51, 52 (2008).
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II. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, CHINESE FDI AND THE
LEGAL SERVICE MARKET
Before the recent political backlashes, MNCs were organizing
their businesses on a global scale. To serve their legal needs, many
elite law firms have expanded their practices abroad.6 This type of
globalization and its impact on the legal profession and the market
for legal services have spawned a plethora of studies from diverse
perspectives. A few of them, for instance, touch on the various
models adopted by law firms during their global expansion.7 Some
develop their international practices through mergers with and
acquisitions of foreign law firms,8 whereas others grow organically,
sending home-trained lawyers to foreign offices to maintain, to the
extent possible, a uniform work quality and culture.9 Another strand
of the literature examines the convergence of commercial law
practices as a result of the global expansion of law firms. 10 For
instance, contracts adopted in international business transactions
increasingly resemble the prototypes produced by elite U.S. and UK
law firms.11 Still others research the interactions between expatriated
lawyers and their local partners when elite firms establish
international practices.12
Although the debate has for years revolved around
globalization and the legal profession of the United States and other

6 See, e.g., Janine Griffiths-Baker & Nancy J Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest
in Global Law Firms: Peace in Our Time, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2541-42 (providing
an overview of how law firms transform globally) (2011); see also Stern & Li, supra note 1,
at 205.
7 See, e.g., Carole Silver, Local Matters: Internationalizing Strategies for US Law
Firms, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 67 74 (2007) (discussing the values U.S. based firms
emphasized when they develop from national to multinational); STERN & LI, supra note 1,
at 205.
8 William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 9
(2014) (providing an example of the purchase of Pangea3 by Thomson Reuters).
9 SILVER, supra note 7, at 83.
10 See generally Daniel D. Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the
Literature and a Research Agenda for Further Study, 41 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 8
(2007) (explaining how the importance of New York corporate law drives the globalization
of U.S. based firms).
11 Id. at 26–27.
12 Jonathan V. Beaverstock, ‘Managing Across Borders’: Knowledge Management and
Expatriation in Professional Service Legal Firms, 4 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 157, 169-72 (2004)
(explaining expatriation and relationships with local staff).
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developed countries,13 a burgeoning literature has recently turned to
developing countries.14 Chinese law firms, for instance, have been
growing exponentially, and some of them have, through mergers or
close partnerships with foreign firms, started global practices. 15
Meanwhile, as a major base for service outsourcing, India assumes a
crucial role in the globalized legal market.16 In both China and India,
changes in the legal profession resonate with the transformation of
the global economic order.17
Insightful as these studies are, scholars have largely
overlooked the recent expansion of Chinese MNCs into developed
countries. Before the onset of the trade wars, Chinese investment
outflow was multiplying at an exponential rate18 and Chinese MNCs
increasingly targeted mature and competitive markets.19 Against that
backdrop, Chinese FDI in the United States grew at an annual rate of
32% from 2010 to 2015, and in 2016 alone, the total investment
doubled to $46 billion. 20 While new investment from China
plummeted thereafter, hundreds of Chinese MNCs had already made

13 Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and
Globalization, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 681 (2013).
14 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Corporate Lawyers in Emerging Markets, 12 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 441, 442-43 (2016) (providing an overview of the growth of multinational
global law firms in developping countries).
15 LIU, supra note 13, at 684.
16 See, e.g., Mihaela Papa & David B Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers and India:
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal
Profession, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 179 (2011); Leonard Bierman & Michael A Hitt,
The Globalization of Legal Practice in the Internet Age, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29,
30 (2007).
17 LIU, supra note 13, at 684; Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant Garth, Lawyers and the legal
profession, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY 105, 114-15 (2015).
18 Karl Sauvant, Challenges for China’s Outward FDI, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 31, 2013,
07:10
AM),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-10/31/content_17070440.htm
[https://perma.cc/X2KK-XWWK].
19 See, e.g., S. Globerman & D. Shapiro, Economic and Strategic Considerations
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 163, 164 (2009);
Andreas Klossek et al., Chinese Enterprises in Germany: Establishment Modes and
Strategies to Mitigate the Liability of Foreignness, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 35, 38 (2012); Ji Li, I
Came, I Saw, I . . . Adapted an Empirical Study of Chinese Business Expansion in the U.S.
and Its Legal and Policy Implications, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 143, 147-49 (2016); see
also Carlo Pietrobelli et al., Chinese FDI Strategy in Italy: The ‘Marco Polo’ Effect, 4 INT’L
J. TECH. LEARNING, INNOVATION & DEV. 277, 281 (2011).
20 Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, New Neighbors: 2017 Update Chinese
Investment in the United States by Congressional District, NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S.CHINA RELATIONS & RHODIUM GROUP, Apr. 24, 2017, at 1.
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investments in the United States, and most of them intend to weather
the ongoing trade war.
Unsurprisingly, one of the most daunting challenges for
Chinese MNCs is to cross the vast legal and regulatory gaps between
the two countries. Given the rapid transformation of the Chinese
economy, all China-based MNCs are nouveaux riches that have
thrived in an institutional context where law is secondary to power.21
Accustomed to such a legal environment at home, Chinese MNCs
confront a huge institutional divide when entering the U.S. market,
where formal laws govern most everyday corporate affairs and
commercial dealings. To adapt to the new institutional setting,
Chinese MNCs have to rely heavily on local legal professionals. How,
then, do they make their selection of U.S. lawyers?

III. WHAT DO CHINESE CLIENTS WANT?
Anecdotal evidence has portrayed Chinese MNCs as reluctant
consumers of high-quality professional services, including legal
services, and has ascribed this reluctance to mindset inertia. 22
Because of the peripheral role of law in China’s domestic setting,
Chinese managers fail to adequately comprehend or assess legal risks
in host countries where law does matter.23 Following this argument,
one would reasonably presume that Chinese MNCs undervalue legal
services in the United States. To evaluate this speculation, we
examine unique empirical evidence about lawyer selection
preferences revealed by Chinese MNC managers in the United States.
A. Possible Factors to Consider in U.S. Lawyer Selection
With more than 1.3 million registered lawyers, 24 the U.S.
legal service market should be able to meet any of Chinese MNCs’
21 Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 118-119 (2017)
(providing a hypothetical commercial dispute example to illustrate the significance of power
over law).
22 Weifeng Ni et al. (倪伟峰等), Zhongtie Jinjun Ouzhou Zheji Bolan: Zenyang Gaoza
Haiwai Xiangmu ( 中 铁 进 军 欧 洲 折 戟 波 兰 ： 怎 样 搞 砸 海 外 项 目 ) [China Railway
Engineering Corporation Enters the European Market but Fails in Poland: How to Screw
up Overseas Projects], CAIXIN CENTURY (XINSHIJI) (July. 25. 2011, 12:18 PM),
http://magazine.caixin.com/2011-07-23/100282935.html [https://perma.cc/M5HK-RK5J].
23 Id.
24 AM. B. ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: HISTORICAL TREND IN
TOTAL
NATIONAL
LAWYER
POPULATION
1878-2019,
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needs. But what are Chinese MNCs looking for in a U.S. lawyer?
For most corporate clients, the ultimate objective of lawyer selection
is to facilitate business transactions and limit legal risks. So, their
selection cannot be analyzed in isolation from recurrent legal issues
and legal service needs arising from their business transactions.
In addition, once their legal service needs have been identified,
corporate clients face the challenge of effectively identifying U.S.
lawyers capable of providing the appropriate services at an optimal
quality to price ratio. Let us begin with the attorney’s fee. Price plays
an essential part in any service market, and the U.S. market for legal
services is no exception.25 In selecting U.S. lawyers, Chinese MNC
managers may be even more cost sensitive. Comparatively speaking,
the Chinese legal service market is underdeveloped, and corporate
clients in China place “ruthless cost pressure” on legal services.26 To
earn business, law firms in China, even many elite international firms,
have to cap their fees or adopt flexible billing methods.27 Having
been used to such practices at home, Chinese companies in the United
States may regard U.S. legal services as exorbitantly expensive and
therefore be more mindful of the price factor.
Besides attorney fees, Chinese investors may also prefer U.S.
lawyers with rich practical experiences. This preference is
commonsensical, as experience constitutes a core value of legal
services. 28 Recent research even suggests, despite the doomsday
predictions, 29 Big Law continues to thrive because these firms’
accumulated deal experiences offer precious information on deal

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/totalnational-lawyer-population-1878-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD8U-MTS2].
25 See, e.g., John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY. 999, 1012
(2011); Elisabeth de Fontenay, Agency Costs in Law-Firm Selection: Are Companies UnderSpending on Counsel?, 11 CAP. MKT. L. J. 486, 496–502 (2016); STERN & LI, supra note 1,
at 194–96.
26 WILKINS, supra note 1, at 293.
27 See, e.g., Tom Brennan, What It Takes to Win—and Keep—Clients in Asia, ASIAN
LAW. (2015), https://www.law.com/home/id=1202736565435/?slreturn=20180715144826
[https://perma.cc/AZ6T-ERGY]; LIU, supra note 4, at 762–63.
28 See, e.g., COATES ET AL., supra note 25, at 1011–17; see also CNV Krishnan &
Ronald W Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J. L. &
ECON. 189, 190–92 (2013) (providing examples in the M&A context).
29 See Larry E Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 (2010)
(explainning the reasons and the effects of failing big law firms).
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terms.30 However, the importance of practical experience may not be
obvious to Chinese corporate clients. As just noted, in China, where
law is secondary to political connections,31 clients typically underappreciate the value of premium legal services. 32 Expatriated
Chinese managers may retain this attitude. Yet, theories also exist
that predict the opposite. International business research has long
documented isomorphism when companies expand overseas.33
Besides attorney fees and practical experience, Chinese
clients may also take into consideration a U.S. lawyer’s Chinese
background. First, the ability to speak Chinese may be a plus. Senior
Chinese executives at Chinese MNCs in their late 40s and 50s went
to school in China decades ago, when English was either entirely
excluded from the curriculum or poorly taught. These clients
naturally prefer U.S. lawyers capable of explaining key legal issues
in Chinese so that they may assess all pertinent risks. Moreover,
words used in ordinary life may nevertheless carry intricate
connotations in the legal context. Chary of being disadvantaged in
negotiations, even those Chinese executives who can speak English
well may still choose to communicate in their mother tongue. In
China, Chinese clients of international law firms “increasingly
demand that all communications, spoken and written, be in
Mandarin.” 34 Why not demand the same in the United States?
Besides language, cultural differences may also impact the

30 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 420 (2015) (explaining how repeat-player law firms can
extract significant rents by aggregating and deploying private information about market
transaction terms).
31 See, e.g., ANG & JIA, supra note 3, at 328–29; ZHANG & LI, supra note 3, at 31–33.
32 Tom Brennan, What It Takes to Win—and Keep—Clients in Asia, ASIAN LAW. (2015),
https://www.law.com/home/id=1202736565435/?slreturn=20180715144826
[https://perma.cc/R22R-9EVL].
33 See, e.g., Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State Ownership Effect on Firms’ FDI Ownership
Decisions Under Institutional Pressure: A Study of Chinese Outward Investing Firms, 43 J.
INT’L BUS. STUD. 264, 279–81 (2012); Chuck CY Kwok & Solomon Tadesse, The MNC as
an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption, 37 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 767, 769–70 (2006); see also Salomon Robert & Zheying Wu, Institutional Distance
and Local Isomorphism Strategy, 43 J INT’L BUS. STUD. 343, 362–64 (2012).
34 Tom Brennan, What It Takes to Win—and Keep—Clients in Asia, ASIAN LAW. (Sept.
6, 2015, 8:48 AM), https://www.law.com/sites/articles/2015/09/06/what-it-takes-to-winand-keep-clients-in-asia [https://perma.cc/G9KZ-9T2Q].
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relationships between U.S. lawyers and foreign clients.35 And a U.S.
lawyer’s Chinese background should help narrow that gap.
The U.S. market for legal services, though large and
competitive, is highly imperfect. 36 Clients, confronting immense
information asymmetry, are usually unable to assess the quality of
legal services.37 In addition, legal service is a typical credence good
in that even seasoned corporate clients may not be able to adequately
evaluate its quality even after its completion.38 The task is even more
daunting for Chinese MNCs unfamiliar with the U.S. legal market.
To address this issue, Chinese managers may pay close attention to
signals of U.S. lawyers’ competence and the quality of their services.
Educational credentials have long been deemed as effective signals
of desirable attributes, such as intelligence and diligence. 39 Mindful
of the crucial signaling value, U.S. law firms have paid fastidious
attention to job candidates’ pedigrees.40 Chinese managers, hailing
from a culture that treasures education, may care a great deal about
where their lawyers received their law degrees.
In addition, a U.S. lawyer’s or a law firm’s prestige can “offer
a type of informal insurance to a potential client. If an important and
complex transaction or litigation does not go well, directors, the CEO,
and others in a corporation will be less likely to second-guess the
decision of the general counsel to retain a charmed circle firm.” 41
Because “nobody ever got fired for hiring Skadden,” MNC managers
or their in-house counsels naturally prefer legal professionals with
35 LIU, supra note 4, at 777; Robert J. Walters, Now That I Ate the Sushi, Do We Have
a Deal—The Lawyer as Negotiator in Japanese-US Business Transactions, 12 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 335, 335 (1991).
36 Jack Ladinsky, The Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the
Channeling of Clients, 11 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 207, 215 (1976) (illustrating the inefficient
distribution of legal services).
37 See, e.g., Asher Wolinsky, Competition in Markets for Credence Goods, J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 117, 127–30 (1995); Ronald J Gilson, The Devolution
of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 889 (1990).
38 GILSON, supra note 37, at 889-90.
39 Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS 283, 287–96
(Peter Diamond & Michael Rothschild, 1978) (using statistical models to explain market
signaling regarding the level of education) .
40 William D. Henderson, The Bursting of the Pedigree Bubble, DIGITAL REPOSITORY
@
MAURER
LAW
(July,
2009),
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/U863-EJD3] (using Cravath as an example to illustrate law firm’s attention
to pedigrees).
41 SOKOL, supra note 10, at 27.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

95

stellar reputations. 42 In addition, as outsiders with a limited track
record, Chinese MNCs may use prestigious law firms as “reputational
intermediaries” to impress potential U.S. business partners.43
Chinese investors may also rely on recommendations from
trusted third parties to remedy their information asymmetry. Prior
research has documented the role of informal networks and
influential intermediaries in supplying information about legal
services.44 To many, informal referrals offer qualitative, inexpensive,
and tailored information not easily available through formal
channels. 45 From the perspective of Chinese MNC managers,
endorsements from parties in long-term cooperative relationships
also function as quality assurance because a reference to inferior
lawyers may reflect negatively on the credibility and the intention of
the acquaintances and jeopardize their established relationships.46
Moreover, local MNC managers may pay close attention to
lawyer recommendations from their Chinese headquarters.
According to a prior study, Chinese SOEs often use outside legal
counsels suggested by their corporate leaders or the leaders of
superior state agencies.47 The rationale behind it, i.e., hierarchical
control within the business organization, remains intact when the
companies expand abroad.48 So, managers running the U.S. show
might favor lawyers well-connected to their companies’ headquarters.
However, in purchasing U.S. legal services, are managers in China
better positioned to overcome the information asymmetry than their
local colleagues? We find conflicting hypotheses. On the one hand,
elite international law firms have operated in China for years and
have advised many of the largest Chinese companies on issues
42

Henderson, supra note 8, at 15. Bruce MacEwen, Nobody Ever Got Fired For Hiring
Skadden,
Adam
Smith,
Esq.,
(Apr.
21,
2004),
https://adamsmithesq.com/2004/04/nobody_ever_got [https://perma.cc/864E-7EGT].
43 See, e.g., Karl S Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15
(1995); Ronald J Gilson & Reinier H Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 1984
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Reinier H Kraakman, Gatekeepers: the Anatomy of a Third-party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., ECON., & ORGANIZATION 53 (1986).
44 LADINSKY, supra note 36, at 213.
45 Id. at 218.
46 Ronald J Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 896 (1990) (discussing how reference to inferior lawyers
may destroy long-term attorney-client relationship).
47 Sida Liu, Palace Wars Over Professional Regulation: In-house Counsel in Chinese
State-owned Enterprises, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 549, 564 (2012).
48 LI, supra note 2, at 85.
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concerning U.S. law or even Chinese law. 49 Such prior dealings,
which narrow the information gap between Chinese corporate clients
and providers of U.S. legal services, may benefit these law firms now
that Chinese MNCs are expanding to the United States. On the other
hand, lawyer selection based on headquarters’ recommendations may
be suboptimal. Executives in China cannot be fully privy to the local
legal predicaments of their U.S. affiliates and their peculiar service
needs. In addition, influence costs, which are common among large
business organizations, may impair the efficiency of U.S. lawyer
recommendations by Chinese headquarters. 50
Either way,
headquarters’ recommendations may be an important factor to
consider.
Furthermore, Chinese investors may prefer U.S. lawyers with
some government background. Back in China, connections with
government officials solve thorny legal problems more effectively
than legal knowledge and skills do. Chinese managers previously
immersed in such an environment may preserve and apply this
cognitive mindset to resolving their legal issues in the United States.
Moreover, Chinese MNCs, especially those with state ownership,
suffer a trust deficiency in the United States, especially in the current
circumstances. 51 Hence, rational Chinese managers in the United
States may prefer to hire lawyers with government backgrounds to
allay this mistrust. In addition, the preference for U.S. lawyers with
government backgrounds may simply reflect a general intent to
manage compliance risks and regulatory costs. Prior empirical
research has shown that “transactional lawyers add value by reducing
regulatory costs.”52 After all, “much of lawyers’ expertise consists
of insider knowledge of the local legal system and social connections
with law enforcement officials.” 53 Arguably, lawyers who have
49 See generally Rachel Stern & Su Li, The Outpost Office: How International Law
Firms Approach the China Market, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 184 (2015); Sida Liu,
Globalization as Boundary-Blurring: International and Local Law Firms in China’s
Corporate Law, 42 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 771 (2008).
50 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the
Organization of Economic Activity, PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57, 58
(1990).
51 Klaus E. Meyer et al., Overcoming Distrust: How State-Owned Enterprises Adapt
Their Foreign Entries to Institutional Pressures Abroad, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 486, 488
(2014).
52 Steven L Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.
L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 492 (2006).
53 LIU, supra note 13, at 670.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

97

previously worked at regulatory agencies have better knowledge of
decision-making mechanisms and access to decision-making
agents.54
To summarize, in selecting U.S. lawyers, Chinese MNCs may
take into account myriad factors, including legal fees, professional
reputation, academic credentials, practice experience, Chinese
background, U.S. government background, and recommendations
from acquaintances and Chinese headquarters. All corporate clients,
regardless of their nationality, seek high-quality and reasonably
priced legal services, hence the attention to U.S. lawyers’ practice
experience and fees. Legal services being credence goods, average
Chinese companies suffer acute information asymmetry in assessing
the quality of U.S. legal services and making optimal purchases. To
ameliorate this issue, Chinese managers may rely on professional
reputation, academic credentials, and referrals from trusted parties.
In addition, due to the gaps between the two countries, some Chinese
MNC managers may benefit from lawyers with Chinese and U.S.
government backgrounds.
Because U.S. lawyer selection typically hinges on multiple
factors, how they rank relative to each other is crucial to drawing
inferences of any practical, policy, and theoretical significance. In
the next subsection, we analyze a unique dataset derived from a
comprehensive survey of Chinese companies in the United States.
Before proceeding, however, it merits noting that the eight factors are
not necessarily independent of each other or mutually exclusive. A
lawyer’s reputation, for instance, inevitably correlates with practice
experience, which in turn relates to legal fees. That being said, the

54 Though few scholars have systematically explored this type of preference, several
prior studies have made such findings. For instance, the Revolving Door literature about
lobbyists demonstrates that the “brokers” between politics and money tend to have
substantial government experience. JOHN P HEINZ, THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS
IN NATIONAL POLICY MAKING (1993). Also, lawyers with government backgrounds dominate
a fast growing experience in white-collar crimes. Charles D Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s
Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large US Law Firms,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, (2011). In addition, the group of professionals that specialize in
advising foreign investors on the national security review process (also known as the CFIUS
review) consist primarily of former federal agency staffers. Diane Bartz & Greg Roumeliotis,
The Washington Insiders Who Work to Get Chinese Deals Approved, REUTERS (Feb. 24.
2016, 2:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-deals-advisors-insight/thewashington-insiders-who-work-to-get-chinese-deals-approved-idUSKCN0VX2PX
[https://perma.cc/J8Q5-DBXC].
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correlations between the factors that exhibit inter-company variations
are limited.55
B. Data on Lawyer Selection Preferences
This empirical study relies primarily on unique survey data
about Chinese companies in the United States. The survey was
conducted in 2017 in collaboration with the China General Chamber
of Commerce (CGCC), by far the largest business association of
Chinese companies in the United States. 56 The survey instrument
contains ninety-four questions that cover a broad range of topics.57
The questionnaires were prepared in simplified Chinese and were
distributed to most CGCC members. The vast majority of the CGCC
board directors completed the questionnaires, ensuring a sample that
is highly diverse in multiple dimensions, such as sector, ownership
type, and investment location.
The survey contains a multiple-choice question inquiring
about the major factor(s) Chinese MNC managers would consider in
the selection of U.S. lawyers.58 As shown in Figure 1, almost all of
the respondents (92.7%) consider a local lawyer’s practice experience
important, which indicates that Chinese managers appreciate the
importance of high-quality legal service. Legal fees are also
important to Chinese executives, but to a much lesser degree (50.3%).
A significant minority of Chinese managers also consider
professional reputation important in selecting U.S. lawyers.

55 Two factors considered important by Chinese executives, i.e., practice experience
and educational credentials, do not vary much across different survey respondents; and given
that the former is close to one and the latter to zero, they are highly correlated.
56 The
list
of
CGCC
board
members
is
available
at
http://www.cgccusa.org/about/governance/ [https://perma.cc/8QXM-2JDR].
57 The annual survey is the fourth one. The comprehensive CGCC survey was
conducted in 2014.
58 The original survey question in simplified Chinese is as follows. [选择美国律师的
主要考虑因素（可多选）: 律师费用; 律师在相关行业的经验; 律师学历; 律师有中国
背景; 律师有美国政府背景; 律师或律师所在律所的名气; 律师有熟人推荐；律师由中
国总部推荐；其他。]
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Figure 1: Major factors considered in selecting lawyers in the United
States
0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
92.7%

Practice experience
50.3%

Legal fee
34.5%

Lawyer or law firm reputation
Recommendation by acquaintances

20.3%

Chinese background

19.8%

U.S. government background

11.9%

Recommendation by Chinese headquarters

11.3%

Educational credentials

7.3%

Data source: CGCC 2017 Survey (177 responses to this multiple-choice question)

About one-fifth of the Chinese managers would take lawyer
recommendations from their acquaintances into consideration. Such
endorsement, which may be solicited from business partners, current
or former colleagues, and other trusted third parties, remedies the
information shortage for some Chinese executives.
Also, nearly 20% of the survey respondents prefer their
lawyers in the United States to have some Chinese background. As
noted earlier, a Chinese background may narrow the institutional
divide between U.S. lawyers and Chinese managers. Aware of this
preference, U.S. law firms with substantial international practices,
especially those keen on soliciting business from Chinese clients,
have begun to hire or promote senior lawyers with Chinese
backgrounds to work in their U.S. offices.59
About 12% of the Chinese managers would prefer U.S.
lawyers with government backgrounds. As noted, the market for
59 For example, Morrison & Forrester LLP recently recruited an experienced lawyer
with a Chinese background from another firm to be a partner at its New York office, because
his “substantial experience advising foreign banking organizations, particularly Chinese
financial institutions, combined with our strong presence in Asia, make him a great asset to
our clients and our firm.” New York Office, Bank Regulatory Partner Joins Morrison &
Foerster, Press Release, Morrison & Forrester LLP (Apr. 23, 2015),
https://www.mofo.com/resources/press-releases/bank-regulatory-partner-joins-morrisonfoerster.html [https://perma.cc/H5SA-JB8N].
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legal services values lawyers with extensive work experience in a
powerful federal agency.60 Besides their insider knowledge, lawyers
with government background should help mitigate suspicion about
companies from a non-ally country, especially state-owned
companies. But why only 12%? Don’t all Chinese investors suffer a
trust deficiency in the U.S. market? The next section will statistically
analyze a few hypothetical answers.
Roughly 11% of the Chinese executives consider
recommendations from Chinese headquarters an important factor in
selecting U.S. lawyers. Only a fraction of Chinese MNCs have
previously worked with U.S. law firms. Those without such
experience are less likely to make lawyer recommendations in the
first place. Also, Chinese MNCs vary in the extent to which their
headquarters control U.S. operations. Some monitor them closely,
but others fully delegate to the local managers, in which case the
headquarters would refrain from intervening in the selection of U.S.
lawyers.61
Somewhat surprisingly, the Chinese managers largely ignore
U.S. lawyers’ educational credentials. For Chinese executives, it is
possible that the signaling value of education is indirect and
tangential compared to a law firm’s prestige and professional
licensing requirements. After all, not many Chinese managers could
recognize the quality difference between a top-twenty and a top-fifty
U.S. law school. The attention to practice experience probably
explains the inattention to credentials.
To summarize, in selecting U.S. lawyers, Chinese managers
almost uniformly value candidates’ practice experience. About half
also consider legal fees important. In decreasing order of likelihood,
Chinese managers also pay attention to prestige, recommendations by
acquaintances, Chinese background, recommendations from Chinese
headquarters, and U.S. government background. Very few consider
U.S. lawyers’ educational credentials. The aggregated data offer a
unique panoramic view of the lawyer selection preferences expressed
by Chinese MNCs in the United States. The finding sheds valuable
60 See, e.g., Sharyn L Roach, Men and Women Lawyers in In-house Legal Departments:
Recruitment and Career Patterns, 4 GENDER & SOC. 207 (1990) (investigating
interorganizational differences in recruitment and career patterns of men and women lawyers
within in-house legal departments); WEISSELBERG & LI, supra note 54, at 1221 (studying
movement of partners between governments and other firms).
61 LI, supra note 2, at 103.
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light on Chinese investors’ service demands and the potential impacts
thereof on the U.S. legal profession and the legal service market.
Meanwhile, the data reveal puzzling company-level variations that
will be examined in the following section.

IV. WHY ARE CHINESE CLIENTS ALL DIFFERENT?
The survey data from Section III illustrate significant intercompany variations in the lawyer selection preferences of Chinese
MNCs in the United States, which raise important questions
unexplored by the existing literature. This section empirically
examines a series of hypotheses in four parallel subparts, each of
which explores a theoretically significant consideration (fee, prestige,
headquarter recommendation, and government background) that
varies across different Chinese MNCs.
A. Legal Fees
As shown in Figure 1, a slight majority (50.3%) of the survey
respondents consider legal fees important for choosing U.S. lawyers.
Those familiar with the Chinese legal service market may find this
result puzzling— why do the other 50% downplay the significance of
legal costs? This subsection proposes and then tests a number of
hypothetical answers. To that end, we create a dummy dependent
variable that equals one, if a respondent considers legal fees
important in choosing U.S. lawyers, and zero otherwise.62 Based on
existing literature and anecdotal evidence, we formulate a list of
factors that may bear on the dependent variable.
State ownership in Chinese investors. Drawing on insights
from the literature on SOEs, we hypothesize that legal fee sensitivity
is associated with the ownership structure of Chinese MNCs.
However, such theories point in opposite directions. Multiple-agency
62

177 respondents answered this question, and, as noted, about half of them consider
legal fees important (See

Table 1).
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problems plague Chinese SOEs and lead to an acute misalignment of
interests between managers and owners. 63 Though the alleged
ownership of SOEs is vested in “the people,”64 it is agents appointed
by certain government bodies that exercise real control over the
management. The government bodies in turn face their own agency
problems. Due to complex, multi-layered agency issues, SOE
managers may heavily discount corporate cost savings. Hence, U.S.
legal fees, unhinged to the remuneration of SOE managers, may not
catch their attention.
However, the same multiple-agency problems give rise to an
opposing hypothesis. Due to severe interest misalignment, Chinese
companies with substantial state ownership often resemble
government bureaucracies in terms of operations and organizational
form. Compared to private firms, SOEs rely more heavily on
measurable metrics such as legal fees to manage their operations.
Embedded in a strict governance hierarchy, SOEs’ employees are
always mindful of ex-post scrutiny from the upper echelons when
acting ex ante. Bureaucratic institutions in China pay close attention
to performance indicators,65 and managers of Chinese SOEs should
be no exception in this regard. In other words, managers of stateowned MNCs may prefer fee-based lawyer selection to selection
using more subtle criteria such as service quality or long-term
corporate benefits.66 In short, highly risk-averse managers at stateowned Chinese companies may pay more attention to fees than their
counterparts at other firms.
To test these two conflicting hypothetical ties between state
ownership and Chinese MNC managers’ U.S. legal fee sensitivity,
we create a dummy independent variable and assign it the value of
one if a Chinese government entity owns more than 50% of a Chinese
investor’s equity interest and zero otherwise. Majority equity interest
63 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 919, 931 (2014).
64 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国企业国
有资产法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1,
2009) 2008 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 5 (China), art. 3,
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-10/28/content_1134207.htm [https://perma.cc/HY34-ZXFM].
65 Wei Zhang, Managing Judges Mathematically: an Empirical Study of the Medical
Malpractice Litigations in Shanghai, 28 CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 373, 374-75
(2017).
66 DE FONTENAY, supra note 30, at 486.
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in theory enables corporate control over the investor’s actions in the
United States, yet it may not be a sine qua non for the home state
government to exert influence. 67 Thus, we code an alternative
dummy variable to capture more extensive and subtle state control,
which equals one if the Chinese government owns more than 10% of
the investor and zero otherwise.
Sectoral regulation. Besides state ownership, the regulatory
intensity of the sectors in which Chinese companies operate may also
have an effect on their legal fee sensitivity. Prior literature has
documented that corporate clients are less cost-conscious when
purchasing legal services for “betting the company” matters. 68 In
heavily regulated sectors such as banking, high-stakes matters
abound, and companies tend to regard legal expenses as a necessary
and ordinary operational expense. Hence, Chinese companies
operating in heavily regulated sectors may downplay the importance
of legal fees. By contrast, companies in less-regulated sectors
encounter routine and standardized legal matters that can be handled
by average lawyers. The managers can therefore afford pivoting
lawyer selection on fee difference. To assess this hypothetical tie
between sectoral regulation and legal fee sensitivity, we create a
dummy variable that equals one if a Chinese company invests in a
heavily regulated sector in the United States and zero otherwise. Of
the nineteen sectors listed in the 2017 survey questionnaire, we
categorize the following eight as heavily regulated at the federal level,
at the state and local level, or both: mining, utilities, construction,
information technology, finance and insurance, real estate and rental,
health care, and public administration.69
Size of U.S. investment. The size of U.S. investment may
relate to legal fee sensitivity. Presumably, the legal service demands
of Chinese companies with extensive U.S. operations would differ
from the demands of those merely testing the market. Yet, one may
67

See, e.g., Curtis J Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism
and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 669 (2014) (Chinese state capitalism can be better
explained by capture of the state than by ownership of enterprise); Ji Li, State-Owned
Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, in 380 STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES IN THE CURRENT REGIME OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Brill Nijhoff,
2014).
68 COATES ET AL., supra note 25, at 999.
69 Some may not consider real estate and rental industry as heavily regulated. We create
an alternative dummy that excludes that sector and rerun all the tests using the alternative
dummy. All the regression results remain largely the same.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/9

104

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

conceive opposing effects of investment size. On the one hand, a
company’s purchasing power, which is approximated by investment
size, should affect the consumption of legal services. Large Chinese
MNCs with a considerable legal expense budget may care less about
fee rates in lawyer selection. On the other hand, everything else being
equal, a high demand for U.S. legal services may justify strict cost
control, e.g., institutionalized assessment and approval of outside
counsels. Such control may elevate managers’ attention to legal fees.
To test the conflicting hypothetical effects of U.S. investment size on
legal fee sensitivity, we code and add to the statistical tests the
variable of a Chinese MNC’s U.S. revenue.70
Duration of U.S. investment. As noted earlier, mindset inertia
may manifest in fee sensitivity. Therefore, Chinese companies that
entered the U.S. market earlier have adapted to the local business
environment’s high legal fees. By contrast, Chinese MNCs that have
just ventured abroad might, given the undervaluation of legal services
in China, pay close attention to fees when selecting lawyers. To test
this hypothesis, we include the duration of a Chinese MNC’s
investment in the United States.
Length of time working in the United States. How long a
Chinese manager has worked in the United States might also bear on
fee sensitivity. Those affiliates that have recently relocated to the
United States may continue to apply the domestic standard and
therefore weigh legal fees heavily in selecting lawyers. By contrast,
those who have worked for years in the United States may have
internalized the local norms regarding legal service cost.
Investment motive. One may also assess normative adaptation
through Chinese MNCs’ investment motives. A company that
follows its existing Chinese customers to the United States is
presumably less integrated into the U.S. business community, and the
lack of frequent interactions with the local community might hinder
Chinese MNC managers’ normative conformation. One survey
question about the respondents’ investment motives, and among the
choices is “to serve existing Chinese clients’ needs in the United
States.” Forty-five out of 198 (22.7%) survey respondents made that
70 In earlier surveys we asked for exact revenue amount of the Chinese companies, yet
the response rate for the question was very low. The respondents were reluctant to disclose
the figure. To address that issue, we made it a scale question. That raised the response rate
significantly. Survey respondents choose one of five levels of revenue. The lowest level is
“below one million dollars” and the highest level is “above 100 million dollars.”
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selection (See Table 1). To evaluate this hypothesis, we create a
dummy variable and assign it the value of one if a Chinese company
is “dragged” to the U.S. market by its Chinese customers and zero
otherwise.
In-house counsel. Legal fee sensitivity may also be
associated with the availability of in-house lawyers. In the past few
decades, the rise in U.S. corporations’ in-house capacity has reshaped
their relationships with law firms.71 The information asymmetry is
essentially internalized to favor in-house lawyers.72 Hence, in U.S.
companies equipped with in-house lawyers, general counsels or their
deputies have assumed a crucial role in the selection of outside
lawyers and the purchase of legal services.73 In light of this literature,
we postulate that the availability of corporate counsels at Chinese
MNCs in the United States may be associated with their legal fee
sensitivity. First, in-house counsel can be regarded as a proxy for the
amount and complexity of legal issues facing a Chinese MNC. And
those confronting frequent and complex legal issues in the United
States may downplay legal fees. Second, the availability of in-house
counsel may signal relevant managerial attitudes; everything else
being equal, Chinese companies with full-time internal legal staff
might take legal and compliance matters more seriously than those
without. Such an attitude might be reflected in less weight being
assigned to attorney fees. Third, in-house counsels, many of whom
are local lawyers themselves, tend to adopt the norms of the U.S. legal
market regarding legal fees. To test these hypothetical connections
between internal legal capacity and varying fee sensitivity, we create
a dummy variable that equals one if a responding MNC has full-time
in-house counsel licensed to practice law in the United States and
zero otherwise.

71 COATES ET AL., supra note 25, at 1001; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Who’s in the
House? The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and General Counsel, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
237, 238-43 (2012).
72 Ronald J Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L. J. 239, 273-76 (1984).
73 See, e.g., FONTENAY, supra note 30, at 488, 497-99; WILKINS, supra note 1, at 251;
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 277, 277-78 (1985).
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Table 1: Summary statistics (all variables used in Section IV)
Variable
Consider legal
fees important
Consider lawyer
or law firm’s
prestige
important
Consider
lawyer’s
Chinese
background
important
Consider
lawyer’s
government
background
important
Consider
recommendation
by
acquaintances
important
Consider
headquarters’
recommendation
important
State ownership
(50%)
State ownership
(10%)
Investment
duration
U.S. revenue
In-house
counsel
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Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

0.503

0.501

0

1

177

0.345

0.477

0

1

177

0.198

0.400

0

1

177

0.119

0.324

0

1

177

0.203

0.404

0

1

177

0.113

0.317

0

1

177

0.393

0.490

0

1

191

0.429

0.496

0

1

191

9.239

9.114

0

36

201

2.452

1.610

1

5

188

0.284

0.452

0

1

190
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Intensity of
sectoral
regulation
To meet existing
customers’ need
Length of time
working in the
U.S.

107

0.381

0.487

0

1

210

0.227

0.420

0

1

198

5.561

6.199

0

35

173

Data source: 2017 CGCC survey 74

Because the dependent variable is binary, we run a series of
logistic regression tests. As shown in Table 2, state ownership is
highly significant. The odds ratio, which is larger than one, indicates
a positive association between state ownership of Chinese investors
and legal fee sensitivity. In other words, Chinese investors with state
ownership (measured at either 50% or 10%) are more likely to
consider legal fees important in selecting U.S. lawyers. Take the
results of Model (5) as an example. When all the other variables are
held constant, the odds that Chinese investors majority-owned by the
state consider legal fees important are 187% higher than the odds for
Chinese investors without majority state ownership.
Table 2: Analysis of the inter-company variation in legal fee
sensitivity
(1)
State ownership
(50%)

2.58***

State ownership
(10%)
Intensity of
sectoral
regulation
Investment
duration
U.S. revenue

(2)

(3)

(4)

2.69***
2.75***

(5)

(6)

2.87***
2.93***

(7)

(8)

2.99**
3.20***

3.09***

.64

.60

.56

.53*

.53*

.49*

.45*

.43**

1.02

1.02

1.03

1.03

1.03

1.04

1.06*

1.06*

.93

.94

.88

.89

.87

.89

74 China General Chamber of Commerce, CGCC Annual Business Survey Report 2017
(June 16, 2017), https://www.cgccusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Survey-Report2017-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XXN-4Q4K].
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1.13

1.06

To meet the
needs of
existing
customers
Length of time
working in the
U.S.
Constant
Number of
observations

1.05

.95

1.24

1.17

.96

.96

.68

.64*

.73

.67

.72

.66

.78

.72

160

160

154

154

152

152

125

125

Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.

The finding, which is robust across all the model
specifications, supports the hypothesis that state-owned Chinese
MNCs are on average more likely to take legal costs seriously. As
discussed earlier, state-owned Chinese MNCs tend to centralize
decision-making authority and impose tight vertical control over their
U.S. operations.75 Just like their U.S. peers, sizable Chinese MNCs
usually set a budget for each year’s legal expenses. And given the
rigidity of bureaucratic management typical in SOEs, exceeding the
budget spells trouble.76 To avoid that, local managers strive to keep
their actual legal expenses close to the planned budget cap, even
though doing so may affect the quality of the legal services and have
a long-term negative impact.
Apart from state ownership, sectoral regulation is significant
at the 10% level in five of the eight models. The odds ratios are less
than one, suggesting that Chinese MNCs in heavily regulated sectors
are less likely to pay attention to legal fees when selecting U.S.
lawyers. Take Model (6) as an example. With the other variables
held constant, the odds that Chinese companies operating in heavily
regulated sectors consider legal fees are about 50% less than the odds
for those in other sectors. The finding is intuitive. As discussed
earlier, in some sectors, compliance necessitates a steady supply of
sophisticated legal services, and low-quality services have high75

JI LI, THE CLASH OF CAPITALISMS? CHINESE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 103

(2018).
76

HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 5, 16.
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stakes and often imminent impacts on the business. Dealing with
state and federal banking regulators, for instance, requires frequent
assistance from lawyers with extensive practice experience. Only
sizable law firms provide services in this area, and they are invariably
expensive. In other words, banks operating in the United States,
regardless of their countries of origin, should be accustomed to costly
legal services. Hence the significant and negative association
between regulatory intensity and legal fee sensitivity. None of the
other variables is significant.
B. Lawyers’ or Law Firms’ Prestige
In selecting U.S. lawyers, some Chinese managers also
consider their professional reputations (See Figure 1). Prestige serves
multiple functions, such as signaling service quality and certifying
clients’ creditability. 77 Then, why do 65% of Chinese managers
disregard this factor? What explains the inter-company variation?
This subsection formulates and tests several hypotheses. We
construct a dummy variable that equals one if a survey respondent
chose a lawyer’s or a law firm’s prestige as an important
consideration and zero otherwise. We discuss below a number of
possible variables that may correlate with the inter-company
variation in reputational sensitivity; the coding of the variables is
detailed in Subsection A.
State ownership in Chinese investors. Once again, we begin
with state ownership in Chinese investors, the key corporate attribute
that distinguishes Chinese outbound FDI from that of most other
countries. We hypothesize that state ownership has an effect on the
attention to prestige. Recall the two major functions of professional
reputation from corporate clients’ perspective: to signal service
quality and to certify the client’s credibility. Evidencing the
certification function, a recent study of the legal profession finds that
Chinese “SOEs want to be seen as engaging top firms . . . to cast off
the image of a developing country SOE and be seen as a global
corporation.” 78 In addition, given the multiple-agency problem
discussed earlier, managers of state-owned Chinese MNCs may be
more inclined to shift legal risks to outside lawyers.
77 DE FONTENAY, supra note
78 STERN & LI, supra note 1,
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Sectoral regulation. The extent to which a sector is regulated
may affect prestige sensitivity. Prior research has shown that U.S.
corporations’ need for regulatory compliance drives their demand for
legal services. 79 In less-regulated sectors where legal services are
standardized, the sophisticated lawyering skills and rich practice
experience offered by prestigious firms add marginal value. As a
result, Chinese investors in such sectors may be inattentive to prestige.
By contrast, in sectors governed by complex laws and regulations,
Chinese MNC managers might seek as much assurance of highquality legal services as possible. Presumably, prestigious law firms
offer that additional assurance.
Investment motive. As noted earlier, a minority of Chinese
MNCs invest in the United States to serve their Chinese customers
that have expanded globally. Occupying a niche market in the United
States, such Chinese MNCs are under less pressure to adapt to the
host country’s environment. Moreover, they do not need prestigious
U.S. law firms to serve as “reputational intermediaries” in
transactions with their existing customers. 80 In short, Chinese
companies “dragged” to the United States might pay less attention to
a lawyer’s or a law firm’s prestige than those driven by the desire to
develop the U.S. market from scratch.
Size of U.S. investment. The size of Chinese companies’ U.S.
investment may have some effects on prestige sensitivity. First,
Chinese MNCs with substantial operations in the United States can
afford the services of prestigious law firms. They may also perceive
hiring lawyers from elite firms as a form of status signal.81 Second,
with more at stake in the U.S. market, such MNCs may care more
about the long-term effects of legal services. Hence professional
reputation, a proxy for high-quality services, is taken seriously. Third,
legal and regulatory complexity typically moves in sync with
business size, so companies with larger investments are more likely
to purchase premium services from elite firms. Of course, one may
contend that the causal arrow points in the opposite direction—those
Chinese companies that have chosen prestigious U.S. law firms are
more likely to mitigate their legal and compliance risks and,
consequently, thrive in the U.S. market. However, given that most
79
80
81

SCHWARCZ, supra note 52, at 492.
See, e.g., KRAAKMAN, supra note 42, at 53; OKAMOTO, supra note 43, at 15.
STERN & LI, supra note 1, at 192.
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Chinese MNCs have only recently entered the U.S. market, such a
long-term effect of compliance, even if it exists, should remain
latent.82
Duration of U.S. investment. The duration of a Chinese
company’s U.S. operations may be tied to the prestige factor. Yet,
the effect is not obvious. On the one hand, newcomers typically face
a wider information gap and therefore have to rely more on reputation
as a signal for service quality. On the other hand, Chinese companies
that have just expanded to the United States may be uninformed about
local lawyers’ or law firms’ prestige. Lacking such knowledge, they
cannot use this factor as an effective proxy for service quality. We
will test the conflicting hypotheses below.
In-house counsel. A Chinese company’s in-house legal
capacity in the United States may be associated with its managers’
attention to professional reputation. As previously noted, the
existence of in-house legal staff may signal the legal and regulatory
complexity of a Chinese company’s business environment. Hence,
those with in-house counsel may be more attentive to professional
reputation. Yet, again, one may make an opposing argument:
Companies with in-house lawyers, largely relieved of the information
asymmetry problem, do not have to count on effective but noisy
signals of competency such as law firm reputation.83
Table 3: Analysis of the inter-company variation in prestige
sensitivity
(1)
State
ownership
(50%)
State
ownership
(10%)
Intensity of
sectoral
regulation

(2)

1.08

(3)
1.05

1.01

1.95*

(4)

1.96*

(5)
1.01

1.01

2.10**

2.10**

.99

1.94*

82 Also, our study, as the first one on this topic, aims mainly at identifying correlation,
rather than causation.
83 RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, at 749.
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(6)

1.95*
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Investment
duration
U.S. revenue
In-house
counsel
To meet the
needs of
existing
customers
Constant
Number of
observations
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1.01

1.01

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.15

1.15

1.29*

1.29*

1.25

1.25

.47

.47

.56

.56

.83

.83

.26***

.26***

.26***

.26***

.28***

.28***

154

154

152

152

146

146

Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.

As shown in Table 3, sectoral regulation significantly and
positively correlates with prestige sensitivity. This finding is robust
across all model specifications. Take the results of Model (6) as an
example. With the other variables held constant, Chinese companies
operating in heavily regulated sectors are 95% more likely to consider
prestige in selecting U.S. lawyers than those in less regulated sectors.
This finding suggests that Chinese companies facing higher
regulatory risks seek the additional assurance of competence and
reliability offered by prestigious law firms.
Moreover, in Models (3) and (4), the size of a Chinese MNC’s
U.S. investment is significant and positively associated with prestige
sensitivity. 84 To use the results from Model (4) as an illustrative
example, all else being equal, one unit increase in the U.S. revenue
scale correlates with an increase of 29% in the odds ratio of
considering prestige in U.S. lawyer selection. One may infer that
Chinese investors with substantial stakes in the U.S. market care more
about the long-term effects of legal services; they are also more
capable of purchasing premium legal services. The result, however,
is not robust, so a more definitive conclusion awaits further research.
None of the other variables is significant.

84

The coefficients are almost significant at the 10% in Models (5) and (6); the p value
is 10.8% for both.
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C. Recommendations by Chinese Headquarters
For 11% of Chinese companies, recommendations by their
Chinese headquarters play a major role in selecting U.S. lawyers. For
decades, U.S. law firms have followed MNCs around the globe and
set up satellite offices in major commercial hubs.85 Now, some of
these firms may extend their service to MNCs from emerging
economies such as China. As noted earlier, numerous international
law firms have been advising large Chinese companies for over a
decade.86 These companies, when expanding to the United States,
may prefer that their U.S. affiliates engage the same law firms.
Obviously, the existence of headquarters’ knowledge or preference
about U.S. lawyers preconditions such recommendations. But apart
from that, what other factors may bear on the inter-company variation
in this variable? To test a number of hypotheses, we code a dummy
variable that equals one if a survey respondent chose “headquarters’
recommendation” as a major consideration in U.S. lawyer selection;
the dummy equals zero otherwise.
State ownership in Chinese investors. State ownership in
Chinese investors may have an effect. As noted above, state-owned
Chinese MNCs tend to centralize decision-making power, and their
headquarters exercise more strict hierarchical control over their U.S.
operations than those of privately-owned Chinese MNCs.87 Given
such control, managers in the United States naturally heed lawyer
recommendations from their superiors in China. Moreover, Chinese
SOEs face heightened institutional pressure in the United States,
which inevitably raises their legal and regulatory risks.88 The agency
theory would predict that SOE managers, in order to circumscribe
their liability, may prefer to engage lawyers recommended by their
headquarters, so if any major legal and compliance issues arise, the
local managers will not be held responsible.
Sectoral regulation. The same agency problem may also link
sectoral regulation to the consideration of lawyer recommendations
85

SILVER, supra note 7, at 1432-33.
STERN & LI, supra note 1, at 185.
87 LI, supra note 2, at 104.
88 For instance, the national security review of foreign investment in the United States
discriminates against the acquisitions of U.S. assets by investors controlled by a foreign state.
For more about the system and how Chinese state-owned investors react to it, see, e.g., Ji Li,
Investing Near the National Security Black Hole, 14 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 1-44 (2017).
86
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from headquarters. Chinese MNCs in heavily regulated sectors face
more legal and regulatory risks, so risk-averse managers may shield
themselves from possible responsibility for violations by deferring to
the Chinese headquarters on U.S. lawyer selection.
Investment duration. The headquarters of Chinese companies
that have just entered the U.S. market may keep their U.S. divisions
on a tighter leash. By comparison, those that have operated in the
United States for an extended period may have more localized
management. As a result, they may discount headquarters’
recommendations in lawyer selection.
In-house legal capacity. Chinese companies with full-time
in-house lawyers may rely more on internal knowledge in selecting
U.S. lawyers, rendering headquarters’ recommendations either
unnecessary or unimportant.
Size of U.S. investment. Chinese companies with substantial
U.S. investments presumably assert more control. Conversely, those
testing the U.S. market anticipate no substantial loss even if their
investments fail, so local managers may enjoy more autonomy.
However, the opposite argument may also be true: large U.S.
operations require on-site management, so local managers downplay
recommendations from their Chinese superiors. This variable also
serves as a baseline, for only sizable Chinese companies have prior
dealings with elite international law firms in China. The headquarters
lacking such experiences will not be able to make proper U.S. lawyer
recommendations in the first place.
Length of time working in the U.S. Chinese MNC managers
who have worked in the United States for years may have acquired
adequate information about the legal service market. Thus, they may
discount any lawyer recommendations from their Chinese
headquarters. In comparison, recent expatriates may lack knowledge
about the local legal market and therefore welcome recommendations
from headquarters.
Table 4: Analysis of the inter-company variation in considering
headquarters’ recommendations
(1)
State ownership
(50%)

4.40**
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(2)

(3)
4.36**

(4)

(5)
5.95***

(6)

(7)
8.49***

(8)

2019]
State ownership
(10%)
Intensity of sectoral
regulation
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4.56**

Investment duration
In-house counsel
U.S. revenue
Length of time
working in the U.S.
Constant
Number of
observations
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4.56**

6.90***

3.37**

3.14**

3.47**

3.26**

5.00**

4.68**

6.02**

6.15**

.99

1.00

.99

1.00

.95

.95

.92*

.92*

.83

.78

.37
1.46*

.33
1.50*

.39
1.49*

.31
1.55*

1.01

1.02

.03***

.03***

.04***

.03***

.01***

.01***

.01***

.01***

160

160

158

158

152

152

131

131

Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.

Table 4 presents the test results. State ownership is significant,
and the odds ratio is larger than one, which indicates that, everything
else being equal, Chinese companies with state ownership are more
likely to select U.S. lawyers recommended by their headquarters.
This finding remains robust across all the model specifications. As
noted, in comparison to privately owned companies, state-owned
Chinese investors allocate more decision-making power to their
headquarters in China. 89 Their centralized and hierarchical
management contributes to the receptiveness of U.S. managers.
Moreover, Chinese SOEs in the United States endure more
institutional pressure in the form of enhanced legal and regulatory
risks. For self-protection, risk-averse local managers may be more
inclined to rely on lawyers recommended by their companies’
Chinese headquarters.
Also significant is the regulatory intensity of the sectors in
which Chinese investors do business. The odds ratio is larger than
one, so Chinese MNCs investing in heavily regulated sectors are
more likely to heed headquarters’ recommendations in selecting U.S.
lawyers. Again, local managers’ intent to mitigate their risk may
explain the finding. If the company violates any U.S. law, which
occurs more frequently in heavily regulated sectors, the local
managers could defend themselves by pointing fingers at the lawyers
“designated” by the Chinese headquarters. Moreover, in heavily
89

12.49***

LI, supra note 2, at 104.
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regulated sectors, compliance may require extensive central–local
coordination, and lawyers recommended by the headquarters may be
better positioned to assume that role.
The size of investment is also significant, and the odds ratio
is larger than one, suggesting that Chinese MNCs with large U.S.
businesses favor lawyers recommended by their headquarters. We
submit that Chinese investors with large stakes in the U.S. market
tend to assert more control over U.S. operations, including the
consumption of legal services. Also, as noted, we deploy the variable
as a control in the tests. Because international law firms and their
Asian offices have mostly served large Chinese companies in the past,
the rest would not have had the opportunity to interact with such law
firms prior to their U.S. expansion. Thus, their headquarters are less
likely to recommend U.S. lawyers in the first place. None of the other
variables is significant.
D. U.S. Government Background
Roughly 12% of Chinese managers consider a government
background important in U.S. lawyers (See Figure 1). This finding
is intriguing in two ways. On the one hand, it may baffle scholars
well-versed in state–business relations in China. Why do not most
Chinese MNCs, having been immersed in a home state where power
trumps law, demonstrate a consistent proclivity to engage lawyers
with government connections? Yet, on the other hand, experts on the
U.S. legal service market may raise quite the opposite question: Why
would so many Chinese investors consider a U.S. lawyer’s
government background important? To test a number of hypothetical
explanations, we create a dependent dummy variable and assign it the
value of one if a survey respondent chose “U.S. government
background” as a major factor to consider in selecting U.S. lawyers
and zero otherwise.
State ownership in Chinese investors. We hypothesize that
the ownership type of Chinese investors is associated with this
preference. Compared to private companies, Chinese SOEs in
foreign countries generally have to cope with more external pressure
due to the lack of trust in them.90 So, state-owned Chinese investors
90

Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility,
34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 395, 398 (2014); CUI & JIANG, supra note 33, at 264.
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may need to legitimize themselves in the eyes of U.S. regulators and
law enforcement agencies. Engaging counsels with U.S. government
backgrounds should help, at least in the eyes of Chinese managers, to
mitigate the trust deficiency. Moreover, sizable SOEs enjoy all kinds
of privileges in their home state, where government agencies are
often regarded as facilitating peers rather than impartial regulators.91
Such a mindset may shape the lawyer-selection preference of
managers at state-owned Chinese MNCs in the United States.
Sectoral regulation. Government regulations vary in form
and extent across different sectors. In sectors where expansive
regulations leave ample room for regulatory discretion, lawyers
boasting a government background are valued for their insider
knowledge and connections. 92 The United States being an
administrative state, foreign companies cannot eschew interacting
with various government agencies. Those facing more agency
scrutiny may show a strong preference for U.S. lawyers with
government experience.93
Duration of U.S. investment. For the same reason, investment
duration may relate to the lawyer selection preference. Companies
that just entered the U.S. market may face more pressure to dispel
suspicion than Chinese companies that have operated in the United
States for decades and have established a good record of corporate
citizenship.
Length of time working in the U.S. Due to normative or
mindset inertia, Chinese MNC managers who have recently moved
to the United States might show a strong preference for U.S. lawyers
with government connections. As noted earlier, Fisman and Miguel
demonstrate that UN diplomats from corrupt countries tend to import
noncompliance behavior to the United States.94 The same logic may
apply here. Back in China, connections with government officials are
crucial to doing business and securing investment, 95 and Chinese
91

LIU, supra note 4, at 769.
BARTZ & ROUMELIOTIS, supra note 54; WEISSELBERG & LI, supra note 54, at 1221.
93 Meanwhile, Chinese SOEs or those heavily controlled by the government tend to
cluster in such sectors. The correlation may well manifest in a positive association between
state ownership in Chinese investors and their preference for U.S. lawyers with government
background. Adding the variable improves test results.
94 Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement:
Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020, 1023 (2007).
95 See generally ANG & JIA, supra note 3, at 318; ZHANG & LI, supra note 3, at 3.
92
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managers accustomed to the home state business environment may
retain their faith in the efficacy of government connections for
resolving tough legal and regulatory issues in the United States.
In-house counsel. In-house legal capacity may bear on the
preference for U.S. lawyers with government backgrounds. It is
possible that Chinese companies with full-time legal counsel can
better navigate the U.S. regulatory system and therefore have less of
a need to rely on well-connected external lawyers to interact with
regulatory agencies.
Size of U.S. investment. All else being equal, Chinese
companies with large U.S. investments may handle more regulatory
issues and therefore interact more frequently with government
agencies. As a result, they may prefer U.S. lawyers with connections
in the government who are familiar with the agencies’ internal
decision-making mechanisms.
Table 5: Analysis of the inter-company variation in considering
lawyers’ U.S. government background
(1)
State ownership
(50%)
State ownership
(10%)
Intensity of
sectoral
regulation
Investment
duration
In-house counsel
U.S. revenue
Length of time
working in the
U.S.
Constant
Number of
observations

(2)

4.72***

(3)

(4)

4.93***
4.73***

(5)

(6)

5.75***
4.99***

(7)

(8)

6.78***
5.54***

4.98**

1.56

1.45

1.68

1.57

1.46

1.38

1.34

1.35

.98

.98

.97

.98

.96

.97

.97

.98

.52

.50

.47
.84

.44
.86

.32
.86

.30
.88

.91

.91

.06***

.06***

.07***

.07***

.12***

.11***

.14***

.14***

160

160

158

158

152

152

131

131
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Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.

As shown in Table 5, state ownership in Chinese investors is
highly significant across all model specifications, and the odds ratio
is larger than one. The finding supports the hypothesis that,
everything else being equal, state-owned Chinese investors prefer
their U.S. lawyers to have some government background. This
preference probably evinces their intent to remedy the trust
deficiency. It is also possible that SOE managers retain their faith in
the efficacy of government connections. None of the other variables
is significant.

V. CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
Economic globalization has been reshaping the legal
profession and market for legal services, and a vast literature has
explored the topic from diverse angles. 96 Yet, so far few have
examined the legal impacts of global expansion by emerging-market
MNCs. Narrowing the immense knowledge gap, our empirical
research analyzes lawyer selection by Chinese companies in the
United States. It makes a number of important practical, policy, and
theoretical contributions.
First, practitioners will find valuable insights in this article
about the service needs of Chinese corporate clients in the U.S. legal
market. As previously mentioned, surging Chinese investment in the
United States brings with it a potential demand for U.S. legal services.
Lawyers and law firms are competing fiercely for a share of this
growing business. However, intuition and anecdotal reports, rather
than systematic empirical evidence, have been guiding the
competition. What do Chinese corporate clients really want? For
instance, should U.S. lawyers advertise good government
connections, if any, in order to attract Chinese clients? How about
highlighting lawyers’ pedigrees? This article presents the first-ever
empirical evidence that directly addresses these questions. The
preference ranking informs U.S. lawyers about what Chinese clients
consider important in the purchase of legal services. Moreover, the
96

See WILKINS, supra note 1, at 271-72.
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analysis of the inter-company variations should help U.S. lawyers
tailor their business development tactics to different Chinese
corporate clients. For example, U.S. law firms should calibrate their
strategies when dealing with state-owned Chinese MNCs, as they
differ systematically from privately owned Chinese companies in
several key aspects of lawyer selection, i.e., legal fee sensitivity,
deference to headquarters’ recommendations, and preference for U.S.
lawyers with government backgrounds.
Second, our findings contribute to the policy debate about
Chinese outbound investments. While optimists have embraced
investments from China for their many tangible benefits, which
include new jobs and low-cost capital, concerns and criticisms are on
the rise that Chinese MNCs export China’s domestic problems. 97
When operating in the United States, will Chinese investors promptly
adapt and comply with relevant U.S. laws? To answer this broad
question, one cannot avoid analyzing how Chinese MNCs interact
with “the gatekeepers,” i.e., U.S. lawyers.98 The empirical evidence
herein strongly suggests that Chinese investors are mindful of the
importance of professional legal services in navigating the complex
U.S. legal system. Though some facets of their U.S. lawyer selection
exemplify peculiar features of Chinese corporate clients, one may
nonetheless infer an overall rational intent to traverse the institutional
gaps and adapt to the U.S. legal and regulatory environment. Of
course, first-rate legal service may not always induce astute legal
actions or full compliance. Future research should investigate the
actual role played by U.S. lawyers in the decision-making of Chinese
MNC executives in the United States.
Third, this article contributes to several ongoing theoretical
debates. We begin with those on MNCs, state-owned enterprises, and
globalization. As previously noted, despite the prominence and
influence of state-owned MNCs, no one has ever researched their
demand for legal services and their interactions with legal
professionals in host countries. Narrowing the gap, this article not
only uncovers their preferences in U.S. lawyer selection but also
pinpoints the significant, albeit uneven, effects of state ownership.
To be more specific, due to centralized bureaucratic control,
97

For a summary of the two opposing views, see Ji Li, I Came, I Saw, I . . . Adapted an
Empirical Study of Chinese Business Expansion in the U.S. and Its Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 143, 150–53 (2016).
98 Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1387 (2004).
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heightened institutional pressure, and the acute agency problem,
Chinese state-owned MNCs pay special attention to legal fees,
lawyers’ government background, and recommendations from
headquarters. In addition, the current study adds to the emerging
literature on various effects of state corporate ownership, which has
largely overlooked any effects on companies’ external service
demands.99 In light of our findings, future research to explore state
ownership and its impacts should probably adopt a more nuanced
approach.
In addition, the study contributes to the scholarship on
globalization, the legal profession, and the legal service market. As
noted, the literature has traditionally revolved around lawyers, law
firms, and MNCs based in the United States and other developed
countries. 100 In the past decade or so, serious attempts have been
made to extend such research to developing countries such as China,
India, and Brazil.101 Yet, few scholars have paid much attention to
the recent reversal of global investment flow driven mainly by
surging Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI). As a first
step towards filling this research gap, our empirical study suggests
that Chinese MNCs will have a very limited impact on the U.S. legal
profession. True, the majority of Chinese managers, especially those
working for state-owned Chinese MNCs, are fee-sensitive, which
may affect how their U.S. lawyers deliver standard legal services.
According to our study, however, U.S. firms that have developed
expertise in heavily regulated sectors will be unlikely to lose their
99

See generally LI, supra note 2; Alessia A. Amighini et al., Do Chinese State-Owned
and Private Enterprises Differ in Their Internationalization Strategies?, 27 CHINA ECON.
REV. 312 (2013); Garry D. Bruton et al., State-Owned Enterprises around the World as
Hybrid Organizations, 29 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSP. 92, (2015); Jing-Lin Duanmu, Stateowned MNCs and Host Country Expropriation Risk: The Role of Home State Soft Power and
Economic Gunboat Diplomacy, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1044, (2014); Antoine Kernen &
Katy N. Lam, Workforce Localization among Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in
Ghana, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1053 (2014).
100 LIU, supra note 13, at 681.
101 LUCIANA CUNHA ET AL., THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 1 (2017); Bryant G Garth, Corporate Lawyers in Emerging Markets, 12
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 441, 442-44 (2016); Xueyao Li & Sida Liu, The Learning Process
of Globalization: How Chinese Law Firms Survived the Financial Crisis, 80 FORDHAM
L.REV. 2847, 2847-48 (2011); Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary—Blurring: International
and Local Law Firms in China’s Corporate Law Market, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 231, 231-3
(2008); Mihaela Papa & David B Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers and India: Toward A
Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal Profession, 18
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 175 (2011).
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Chinese clients over hefty fees. Put differently, instead of wreaking
havoc on the U.S. market for legal services, growing Chinese
investments will reinforce the current trend.102 Those offering mere
standardized and commoditized services will face increasing cost
pressure, but firms capable of servicing complex transactional,
compliance, and litigation matters may charge clients (including costconscious Chinese clients) high fees because the price for such
services remains inelastic, irrespective of the nationality of the
corporate clients.103
Also, our findings add to the scholarship on the value of
business lawyers, for which scholars have proposed several
theoretical explanations. In a nutshell, business lawyers create value
by functioning as “transaction cost engineers” 104 or “reputational
intermediaries,” 105 or by reducing regulatory costs 106 or deal
information costs. 107 While the theoretical debate continues,
empirical research is lacking in the context of foreign corporate
clients’ need for U.S. legal services. The finding in Section IV that
Chinese MNCs in heavily regulated sectors take professional
reputations seriously confirms the theory that business lawyers add
value by reducing their clients’ regulatory costs.108 Meanwhile, the
finding that investment duration is insignificant in any of the
statistical tests calls into question the theory that analogizes
transactional lawyers to “reputational intermediaries.” 109
Presumably, those Chinese MNCs that entered the U.S. market early
have established an observable track record and therefore have less
need for the certification of prestigious firms. Therefore, the fact that
investment duration does not correlate with reputational sensitivity
casts doubt on the validity of the theory.
Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the burgeoning
literature on the adaptation of emerging market MNCs to host country

102

Adam Sechooler, Globalization, Inequality, and the Legal Services Industry, 15
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 231, 232 (2008).
103 SOKOL, supra note 10, at 26.
104 Ronald J Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L. J. 239, 253 (1984).
105 Karl S Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 18 (1995).
106 SCHWARCZ, supra note 52, at 491.
107 DE FONTENAY, supra note 30, at 400.
108 SCHWARCZ, supra note 52, at 492.
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institutions. 110 Chinese companies in the domestic setting tend to
undervalue legal services, and anecdotal reports suggest mindset
inertia when they expand to developed markets. 111 However, the
evidence herein suggests the opposite. For instance, though clients
in China put enormous cost pressure on law firms, in the United
States, more Chinese companies are concerned with lawyers’ practice
experience than with their legal fees. Of course, this sanguine take
will be more robust if future empirical research can demonstrate that
Chinese MNCs, aided by local lawyers, comply with U.S. laws and
regulations at levels comparable to U.S. domestic companies. Future
studies should also compare the set of factors considered important
by Chinese investors and investors from other capital-exporting
countries.

VI. CONCLUSION
The expansion of emerging market multinationals, especially
multinationals based in China, has ushered in a new era of economic
globalization. Two features distinguish it from earlier waves of FDI:
First, most of these MNCs have survived and thrived in a home state
environment where law often plays a secondary role. Second, the
state tends to intervene extensively in the management of the MNCs
and their business dealings, either directly, through equity ownership
and personnel control, or indirectly, through directives or fiats.
Accustomed to such an institutional context, emerging market MNCs
face daunting challenges when investing in developed countries. To
navigate the stricter and more complex legal systems of their host
states, these MNCs rely on local lawyers; the disruption of the global
economic order under the Trump administration has further
strengthened their reliance. Few scholars have so far examined this
novel and important phenomenon. To begin to fill this gap, this
article empirically investigates how Chinese MNCs select their U.S.
lawyers. It finds that Chinese managers uniformly emphasize
practice experience and ignore lawyers’ educational credentials.
110 See, e.g., LI, supra note 2, at 1; Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State Ownership Effect on
Firms’ FDI Ownership Decisions under Institutional Pressure: A Study of Chinese Outward
Investing Firms, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 264 (2012); LI, supra note 100, at 148; Salomon
Robert and Zheying Wu, Institutional Distance and Local Isomorphism Strategy, 43 J INT’L
BUS. STUD. 343 (2012).
111 LIU, supra note 4, at 768.
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Legal fees matter, but to a much lesser degree than what anecdotal
reports have implied. Some Chinese MNC managers also consider
prestige, Chinese background, recommendations by acquaintances,
U.S. government background, and headquarters’ recommendations.
Overall, the distribution of the factors (See Figure 1) portrays an
image of rational foreign investors adapting to multiple institutions,
including the host country’s legal environment.
Further statistical analysis of the inter-company variations,
however, reveals interesting and uneven connections between state
ownership in Chinese investors and their selection of U.S. lawyers.
Sectoral regulation, in-house legal capacity, and U.S. investment size
are tied to one or several of the lawyer selection considerations. The
findings help law firms in the United States and other developed
countries to understand their potential clients from China. They also
fill major gaps in the literatures about economic globalization,
emerging-market MNCs and their adaptation to host country
institutions, SOEs and Chinese FDI, the corporate counsel movement,
and the impacts of investment from China and other emerging
economies on the legal profession and legal service markets of
developed countries.
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